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Abstract: All subtypes of influenza Type A viruses infect wild birds , especially waterfowl and
shorebirds , but rarely cause disease or mortality in these aquatic species. Aquatic birds are the
natural reservoirs for low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPA[) that are distributed globally.
However, some AI subtypes can be virulent in other animals and humans and some highly
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pathogenic AI viruses (HPAI) have caused major outbreaks in poultry and even pandemics in the
human population. The emergence of a HP Al HSN l subtype in southeast Asian poultry in l 997
subsequently involved mig ratory waterfowl in 2005 and has since spread westward throughout
the Asian , European , and African continents . This rapid continental spread alanned animal and
human health agencies in North America and initiated tbe establishment of a National Strategy
for Pandemic influenza in the United States to increase and expand surveillance for the early
detection of this virus , to improve and expand preventative measures , and to develop
contingency responses to possible outbreaks. One of the methods of emergency surveillance
developed and implemented was an interagency , early detection system for HPAI HSN I avian
influenza in wild migratory birds with the potential to bring in the virus from Asia or Europe and
spread it throughout North America.
As part of this early detection system , the Wildlife Services National Wildlife Research
Center developed testing methods , sampling protocols , guidelines , and analyzed 50 , 184 avian
fecal samples collected by Wildlife Service biologists in 50 states and the U . S. territories .
Samples were pooled in the laboratory (n = 10,541 pools) and analyzed using RT-PCR . AI
viruses were detected in 4.0 % of the 10,54 l sample pools analyzed and H5 /H7 subtypes were
detected in 0.2% of the sample pools. Positive HS and H7 subtypes were shipped to the National
Veterinary Services Laboratory for further evaluation and confirmation. This monitoring effort
was successful in detecting AI viruses in environmental samples and has proven to be a rapid and
cost effective surveillance method.
Proceedings of the 1th Wildlife Damage
Management Conference (D.L. Nolte , W .M.
Arjo , D.H . Stalman , Eds) . 2007

INTRODUCTION
Avian

have been detected in wild bird reservoirs or
poultry (Olsen et al. 2006). Avian Influenza
viruses are shed in the feces of infected
waterfowl and Al virus can persist in feces
for short periods and remain relatively stable
and viable for days to months in water in
which the birds swim , defecate , and feed
(Stallk.necht et al. 1990 ; Ito et al. 1995) .
Fecal /oral transmission
is the primary
method of virus spread to susceptible
waterbirds and may be more efficient in
shallow water where the virus is more
concentrated and thus more likely to expose
dabbling ducks that feed there.

influen za

viruses
(lnjlu enzavirus, Orthomyx oviridae) infect
wild birds globally and the natural reservoirs
are wild waterfowl , gulls and shorebirds
(Webster
1998) .
Ducks ,
particularly
dabbling ducks , are the primary species
infected
with
low
pathogenic
avian
influenza viruses that rarely cause disease or
mortality in wild aquatic species. LPAI
viruses have been isolated from more than
I00 wild bird species using cloaca! samples
with an overall prevalence of 5. 16% (Table
I) and nearly all of the AI virus subtypes
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Table 1. Groups of waterbirds infected with avian influenza viruses (adapted from Olsen et al.
2006).
Bird Group
No. Species
No. Tested
No. Positive
% Positive

Ducks
Geese
Swans
Gulls
Terns
Waders
Rails
Petrels
Cormorants
Total

36
8
3
9
9
10
3
5
1
84

34,503
4,806
5,009
14,505
2,521
2,637
1,962
1,416
4,500
71,859

3,275
47
94
199
24
21
27
4
18
3,709

9.5%
1.0%
1.9%
1.4%
0.9%
0.8%
1.4%
0.3%
0.4%
5.16%

2006).
It has subsequently spread across
Asia, Europe, Middle East, and into Africa
in 2005-06 while causing mortality in
poultry , swans, waterfowl species, and
occasional other species. The outbreaks in
poultry resulted in over 209 million birds
dying or being culled around much of the
world since January 2004 (Peiris et al.
2007).
The
local
and
continental
geographical spread of the HPAI HSNI
virus was a result of a combination of
factors. Local spread was likely achieved by
human movement of poultry and poultry
products (Webster et al. 2006). Longerdistance spread within and across regions
likely occurred as a result of commercial
trade of poultry and poultry products and
migratory birds . The role of migratory
waterfowl
and
shorebirds
has
been
implicated in the global spread of AI
viruses , especially LPAI (Olsen et al. 2006).
Millions of wild birds move within and
between large continents along major routes
or flyways where bird populations connect
with each other and transmit viruses during
the sharing of common wintering areas,
staging areas, or breeding grounds.
For
example, birds migrating within the West
Pacific and the East Asian-Australasian

AI virus strains can infect and have
low virulence for domestic and wild birds.
However, these viruses are unstable and
evolution
of AI viruses
occur with
unpredictable
frequency
through
the
constant mingling of multiple subtypes in
wild waterfowl populations and the frequent
exchange of genetic material (Webster et al.
l 992). Therefore, some AI virus subtypes
can become highly virulent and produce
acute clinical disease and mortality in
poultry.
These highly pathogenic AI
(HPAI) viruses are extremely infectious, and
once established, can spread rapidly among
poultry flocks and wild bird populations.
An outbreak
of a new high
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) HSN l
subtype virus occurred in Hong Kong
poultry in 1997 and reemerged in 2002-03
(Webster et al. 2006). This HSN I virus
devastated the poultry industry in Southeast
Asia since 2004 and caused an outbreak and
mortality in migratory geese in Qinghai
Lake, China during 2005 (Liu et al. 2005).
HPAI HSN 1 virus then spread from China
south to Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand,
Laos, and Indonesia
where numerous
outbreaks occurred in poultry and numerous
human cases were reported that were
acquired from sick or dead poultry (WHO
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testing of fecal samples collected in all 50
states and United States territories by WS
and associated field biologists. The methods
developed and results of this sampling in
2006 are presented here.

flyways overlap with each other and with
birds in Alaska where some of them share
common
breeding
areas
with North
American birds (Webster et al. 2006).
Serious concerns have been raised
about the potential impact of HP Al HSN 1
virus on domestic poultry , wild bird
populations, and humans in the event that it
is introduced into the United States. One
potential route of introduction of HSN 1 into
the United States could be through the
migration of infected wild birds through
Alaska and the Pacific flyway or through
eastern Canada and the Atlantic flyway
(Peterson 2006).
ln response to these
concerns, the U.S. government developed a
"National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza"

METHODS
National
surveillance
utilizing
environmental
sampling
was
initially
focused on Alaska, where HSN I was likely
to be introduced from Asia, and secondarily
on the Atlantic coast , where HPAI could be
introduced by migratory birds that cross
over the Atlantic Ocean from Europe to
Canada and south along the eastern coast of
the United States (USDA 2006). Special
attention was given to locations along major
flyways , particularly
the Pacific and
Missis sippi
flyways ,
that
migratory
waterfowl use when moving south from
Alaska and Canada during the fall and
winter.
These birds over winter in the
southern United States and farther south into
the Caribbean and Latin America. The goal
was to select sites containing feeding
waterfowl of priority species of dabbling
ducks identified in the wild bird plan
(USDA 2006) and to collect 20-30 fresh
fecal samples from each location . The
spacing of the collection was designed to
represent,
as much as possible , the
distribution of all birds using the local body
of water, and to collect 5 separate samples at
multiple sites along the shore. A sample
was collected from each fresh feces in the
field with a swab that was immediately
placed in a vial with transport media (BA-I)
contammg
antibiotics.
Samples were
labeled with bar codes, transported from the
field on ice packs , and shipped with ice
packs to the NWRC in Colorado within 48
hours of collection.
Once
sample
shipments
were
received at the NWRC laboratory, bar codes
on all samples and corresponding data sheets
were scanned and entered into a laboratory

(http: // www.pandemicOu.gov /plan /tab ! .html).

One major component of this national
strategy was an interagency strategic plan
for an early detection system for highly
pathogenic H5Nl avian influenza in wild
migratory birds (USDA 2006). The plan
outlined five major surveillance strategies
for detecting HSN I: I) inve stigation of
morbidity /mortality events; 2) surveillance
of live wild birds ; 3) surveillance of hunterkilled birds ; 4) sentinel species; and 5)
environmental sampling.
The National
Wildlife Research Center (NWRC) , Wildlife
Services, Animal Plant Heath Inspection
Service, United States Department
of
Agriculture, was designated to develop
methods for the detection of Al virnses in
environmental
samples by direct PCR ,
organize field collection of samples, and test
environmental samples collected nationwide
from high-risk waterfowl habitats in the
United States. The environmental sampling
involved the analysis of both water and fecal
material collected from waterfowl habitat to
provide evidence of Al circulating in wild
bird populations, the specific AI subtypes,
levels of pathogenicity, and possible risks to
humans and poultry. The Wildlife Disease Program ofNWRC conducted the laboratory
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information management database system
(limsExpress™,
Dynamic
Databases ,
Guthrie, OK), that was specifically designed
to handle the large volume of samples that
were received and tested for Al viruses.
Samples were pooled with 1- 5 samples per
pool based on GPS coordinates and dates of
sampling. Pooled samples were treated with
inhibitex (Qiagen Inc ., Valencia , CA) to
reduce natural inhibitors and RNA was
extracted by hand if there were S 100 pooled
samples , or with a robotic workstation
(BioRobot MDx, Qiagen Inc. , Valencia,
CA), if there were > l 00 pooled samples to
process at once. Extracted RNA was tested
by PCR (7900 HT , Real-Time PCR System,
Applied Biosystems , Foster City, CA) with a
primer for the AI matrix gene. Any AI
matrix positive pool was subsequently tested
with HS and H7 specific primers /probes
following
the proc edures described
in
Spackman et al. (2002). The real-time PCR
assay using the AI virus matrix gene was
developed for the rapid detection of type A
influen za virus and the HS and H7
hemagglutinin subtype-specific
probe sets
were developed to detect potential HPAl
viruses (Applied Biosystems , Foster City,
CA) .
HS and H7 positive pools were
shipped overnight within 48 hours of our
receiving
the samples to the National
Veterinary Service Laboratory (NVSL) in
Ames, Iowa , where confim1ation , virus
isolation , subtyping , genetic analy sis, and
patho ge nicity testing of HSN 1 po s itiv es
were conducted.
The standard procedures
for detection of influenza virus at NVSL
were virus isolation in embryonated chicken
eggs and hemagglutinin
subtyping
by
hemagglutination
inhibition
(HI) assay
(Swayne et al. 1998). The results were
reported through established administrative
channels .
An expert external committee was
formed to develop a nationwide, statistically
ngorous
sampling
design
to provide

scientific
guidance
to WS operations
biologists in collecting samples from all 50
states for the detection of HPAI HSN I virus.
The committee will also provide guidance in
implementing the design using an adaptive
management approach and analysis of data
resulting from implementation of the design.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
From May 1 to December 31 , 2006,
50 , 184 fecal samples were collected from all
50 states, Guam, American Samoa, and the
Mar shall Islands with a mean of 1,004
samples (range = 114-1 ,505) collected per
state or territory. These samples were tested
in 10,541 pools. Of these pools , 419 pools
(4.0%) were found PCR positive for AI
viruses and 22 pools (0 .2%) were PCR
positive for H5/H7 subtypes (20 HS and 2
H7) , that were sent to NVSL
for
confirmation and identification . None of the
AI positive sample pools were confirmed as
HSN 1. No Al viruses were detected in any
sample pools from Hawaii , Maryland ,
Wyoming, or the Pacific Island territories.
AI viruses were isolated in embryonated
chicken eggs at NVSL from 14 of the 22
PCR positives (64 %) and the Al subtypes
isolated thus far included 8 HS subtypes (6
H5N2 and 2 H5N8) , 2 H3N2 , and l each of
H3N4 , H4N6 , HI0N7 , and HI IN9 subtypes.
No Al viruses were iso lated from 5 of the
PCR positives , but 3 low pathogenic avian
paramyxoviru s- 1 viruses were iso lated.
This sampling effort determined that
fecal samples contain Al virus that can be
detected directly by RT-PCR without BSL-3
containment.
No H5Nl
viruses were
confinned although other AI virus subtypes
were identified. Environmental
sampling
was successful in detecting an overall
prevalence of 4% Al viruses from a wide
variety and quality of waterfowl habitats
over an 8 month sampling period.
This
prevalence is similar to the overall AI
prevalence of infection in individual wild
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birds (5%) reported previously (Olsen et al.
2006).
Environmental
sampling of
waterfowl fecal samples appears to be a
viable method of monitoring AI viruses in
waterfowl
populations.
Environmental
sampling requires less effort than sampling
live birds and has proven to be a rapid, cost
effective surveillance
method.
Fecal
sampling could complement regular bird
sampling or substitute for capturing and
sampling birds at sites where it may be the
only reasonable approach.
Future activities will include the
comparison
of
fecal
sampling
to
cloacal/tracheal sampling of live birds for
detecting AI infections in water birds. Water
sampling for the detection of Al viruses by
PCR was investigated in 2006 and will be
fully developed and implemented as an
additional
surveillance
method.
The
sampling design committee bas reviewed
band recovery data and the distribution of
fecal samples collected from wild birds in
2006 to develop a targeted sampling strategy
for fecal sampling for the 2007 national
HPAI surveillance in wild migratory birds.
This more targeted approach will focus
sampling in areas with the highest risk of
HP AI introduction.

and identification
viruses.

of the AI HS and H7
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